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Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57 (December 30, 
2010)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – DISCOVERY SANCTIONS 
 
 
Summary 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court denied Goodyear’s request for a rehearing regarding 
the Court’s ruling in Bahena I.2
 
  Additionally, the Court clarified that evidentiary 
hearings are not mandatory for non-case concluding sanctions. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court denied Goodyear’s rehearing request because the Court did not 
overlook or misapprehend material facts or law or controlling legal authority.3
 
  
Additionally, Nevada case law does not require an evidentiary hearing for non-case 
concluding sanctions and due process did not require an evidentiary hearing here. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Two discovery disputes led to the district court’s discovery sanctions against 
Goodyear.  First, the discovery commissioner found that Goodyear was not acting in 
good faith when it failed to adequately respond to interrogatories and production 
requests.4  Second, Goodyear failed to present a Goodyear representative for a deposition 
after the discovery commissioner denied its motion for a protective order.5
Initially, the district court struck Goodyear’s answer as to both liability and 
damages.
   
6  Goodyear moved for reconsideration and the district court heard the matter on 
January 18, 2007.7  At that hearing the attorneys for Bahena and Goodyear made factual 
representations and answered the district court’s questions.8  The district court ruled that 
Goodyear’s conduct was prejudicial but reduced the sanctions, striking Goodyear’s 
answer as to liability but not as to damages.9
A jury awarded Bahena a judgment in excess of $30 million
 
10 and Goodyear 
appealed the discovery sanctions.  In Bahena I the Court held that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when sanctioning Goodyear because it exercised proper authority 
under NRCP 37(b)(d).11  Bahena I also ruled that the nature of a hearing for non-case 
concluding sanctions is left to the district court’s discretion.12
Goodyear sought a rehearing, arguing that the Court 1) misapplied Nevada law; 2) 
deprived Goodyear of due process; 3) created a double standard between plaintiffs and 
defendants; and 4) contradicted other jurisdictions. 
 
                                                        
1 By Michael Gianelloni 
2 Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 Nev. ___, 235 P.3d 592. 
3 NEV. R. APP. P. 40(c)(2). 
4 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 594. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 595. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 596. 
11 Id. at 597. 
12 Id. at 601. 
  
Discussion 
 
A. Nevada Case Law 
  
The Court explained it followed Nevada precedent for sanctions discussed in 
Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building.13  In Young, the Court stated it would not substitute its 
judgment for the district court’s judgment in an abuse of discretion review,14 and that a 
dismissal sanction need not be preceded by less severe sanctions.15
The Court explained it also considered Foster v. Dingwall
 
16 before ruling in 
Bahena I.  Dingwall held that NRCP 37(b)(2)(C) and 37(d) give the district court the 
authority to strike pleadings for failure to obey discovery orders or attend its own 
deposition.17
 
  Additionally, the Court stated that Nevada does not follow the federal 
model, which requires progressive sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders.  
The Court then held that district courts have discretion in deciding what factors it 
considers when determining discovery sanctions. 
B. Due Process and the Sufficiency of the January 18, 2007 Hearing 
  
The Court next stated that the January 18, 2007 hearing afforded Goodyear 
sufficient due process.  This dispute did not require a full evidentiary hearing because the 
witnesses were attorneys, who are bound to act with candor before tribunals by the 
Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC).18
The majority then agreed with the dissent that evidentiary hearings should be 
encouraged when there are disputed issues of material fact, and that witnesses can assist 
district courts in making findings of fact.  However, the Court noted that Goodyear 
requested an evidentiary hearing, but did not describe what evidence the district court 
should consider other than the attorney’s statements at the January 18, 2007 hearing. 
  RPC 3.3 allowed the district court to 
receive factual representations from the attorneys without the need for cross-examination. 
 
C. Double Standard 
 
The Court noted that plaintiffs and defendants receive similar treatment for 
discovery abuses under Nevada law.  It then explained that Goodyear incorrectly relied 
upon Nevada Power v. Fluor Illinois19 to support its argument that answers dismissed as 
to liability require full evidentiary hearings.   In Nevada Power, the district court 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice,20
 
 ending the case. Here, Goodyear still had the 
right to contest damages.  The Court declined to extend Nevada Power’s holding to non-
case concluding discovery sanctions. 
D. Authority from Other States                                                         
13 Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990). 
14 Id. at 92, 787 P.2d at 779. 
15 Id. at 92, 787 P.2d at 780. 
16 Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. ___, 227 P.3d 1042 (2010). 
17 Foster, 227 P.3d at 1048. 
18 NEV. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.3. 
19 Nevada Power v. Fluor Ill., 108 Nev. 638, 837 P.2d 1354 (1992). 
20 Id. at 643, 837 P.2d at 1358. 
 
The Court reiterated that case law from other jurisdictions is not controlling.  It 
then noted that none of the cases Goodyear cited from other jurisdictions require 
evidentiary hearings in all cases before a trial court can strike a defendant’s answer as to 
liability only.  The Court pointed out that the appellate court affirmed the striking of an 
answer without an evidentiary hearing in some of the cases.21  In other cases the appellate 
court reversed the striking because of the specific facts in those cases, but because of a 
blanket rule.22  The Court also noted that some of the cases Goodyear cited emphasized 
the trial court’s authority to impose severe sanctions when necessary.23
The Court then addressed a case where the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a 
discovery sanction because the sanction was not commensurate with the harm.
 
24
 
  The 
Court stressed that though Colorado requires a proportionate sanction, it does not require 
an evidentiary hearing for all sanctions striking an answer as to liability only. 
Dissenting Opinion 
 
 The dissent argued that due process required a rehearing.  It stated that disputed 
issues of fact existed concerning what discovery violations occurred, whether they were 
willful, whose fault created the delay, and whether there was prejudice.  The dissent 
pointed out that the issue was whether this non-case concluding discovery sanction 
required an evidentiary hearing, not whether all non-case concluding discovery sanctions 
require an evidentiary hearing. 
 The dissent then noted that the discovery violations were relatively minor, unlike 
those in Young and Nevada Power.  Goodyear’s violations concerned how it organized 
documents it produced, not the destruction or fabrication of evidence.  Additionally, the 
experts for whom the documents were produced admitted they had previously read the 
documents and did not need them for their opinions.  This raised questions for the dissent 
of whether there was actual evidentiary prejudice. 
 The dissent concluded that the majority moved away from the clear Nevada 
precedent that disputed questions of fact concerning willfulness, prejudice or 
proportionality require an evidentiary hearing.  The majority replaced this with an unclear 
discretionary standard. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court stated that the district court was within its power to administer this 
sanction through NRCP 37(d) and the court’s inherent equitable power.  The Court 
denied the rehearing because it did not overlook or misapprehend material facts or law or 
controlling legal authority in Bahena I when it affirmed the district court’s ruling.  
Additionally, evidentiary hearings are not mandatory for non-case concluding sanctions.  
The dissent argued the controlling authority the majority overlooked, misapplied or failed 
to consider was that of due process. 
                                                        
21 See e.g., Sims v. Fitzpatrick, 288 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) 
22 See e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 629 A.2d 1160 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). 
23 See e.g., State Farm v. Health Horizons, 590 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
24 Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo. 2009). 
